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The Taking and Killing of
Hostages: Coercion and
Reprisal in International Law
I. Introduction
The taking and killing of hostages has long been an accepted component of
armed conflict. Because the taking of hostages has recently become a primary
component of politically motivated terrorism, a cogent overview on an inter-
national scale of the legal consequences of such actions by belligerents, pursuant
not only to a state of war (international armed conflict), but to status mixtus
(armed conflict in which some aspects of peaceful relations remain extant), and
to internal armed conflict (revolution, insurgency, or belligerency) is essential
to the development and application of remedial or preventative measures by
belligerents and non-belligerents alike. These consequences are delineated with
some particularity in the rules and principles of international customary law
as it is applied to conflict conceded by the combatants to be international in
scope. Status mixtus and internal armed conflict, which are mutant types of
armed conflict spawned by the nuclear age with its attendant paranoia concern-
ing universal annihilation and which are not classified as major wars, are also
amenable to an efficacious application of the international law of war and
neutrality.'
In order to lay a foundation on which legal conclusions may validly be
predicated, this discussion begins with a synopsis of the historical development of
the practice of taking hostages and continues with an analysis of Russian, Arab,
Israeli, German, Italian and American experiences in light of their teleological
bases, their ideological foundations, and their psychological orientation with
regard, not to the victims per se, but to the victims in the larger sense, i.e., the
populace to be terrorized and influenced. This tripartite discussion will show
both that the denomination of violence as terrorism presently assumes political
considerations as a primary rationale for that violence and that terrorism is
merely a different form of "criminal" violence which its perpetrators try to ennoble
by recourse to social theorization, political philosophizing, or fierce dedication
to the necessity of resort to ideologically symbolic duress. It is at this point that
the "necessities" of war and the "rights of humanity" conflict. It is here that
the laws of war and neutrality and socio-political concerns are juxtaposed. The
result is all too often violence against civilians who are neither individually nor
solidairement2 responsible for the situation which has precipitated their detention
or execution. Power is thus established by horrifying the populace, by shocking
the sensibilities of civilized peoples. Force is effectively exercised against many
by the victimization of a few. To deny that this is negative utilitarianism and
1 The decisions of post-World War II war crimes tribunals are examples of derivative
and concretized application of international rules and principles. Such remedial steps are tyost
facto because such decisions rendered during the course of an ongoing conflict would be
without the requisite jurisdiction.
2 Solidairement is a French term connoting joint and several liability.
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true military economy is to be naive. The only possible grounds for condemna-
tion of these acts derive from those elusive quanta, morality and legality.
In analyzing the validity and effectiveness of the reactions of civilized
people to these terroristic activities, the same criteria must be employed. Although
it is fortunate that people do react, it is unfortunate that the reaction is not always
equal and opposite in nature, but rather equal or greater and similar. In short,
violence very consistently does beget violence. Morality and legality at this point
are problematical.
For the purposes of this note, it is the non-violent, i.e., the systematized and
self-styled legal reactions, that must be scrutinized to determine the state of inter-
national law with regard to the taking and killing of hostages. Consensual
agreement among civilized nations which are considered declaratory of interna-
tional customary law will be one of the primary focal points of this investigation.
Because such consensual agreements regarding armed conflict go back to the
beginnings of written history, an arbitrary selection of the years 1899 to 1949
has been made. This time span encompasses three sets of conventions of un-
questionable importance and timely relevance: the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907' and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.' In addition, the internationally
"criminal" nature of the taking and killing of hostages will be evaluated with
reference to the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.) at
Nuremberg-specifically the French presentation by Monsieur De Menthon and
Monsieur Dubost (Deputy Chief Prosecutors for the French Republic) of the
prosecution's case on the counts of war crimes stricto sensu s and crimes against
humanity'---and with reference to the proceedings of the United States Military
Tribunal (U.S.M.T.) at Nuremberg in the Hostages Trial!
Finally, the state of the law today will be discussed from the following
vantage points: (1) the relative universality of the Nuremberg Principles as
indicated by the relevant 1946 resolutions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations,' the Genocide Convention of 1948,' the codification of those
principles by the International Law Commission of the United Nations,"0
modifications introduced in the military law of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America," and courses
of action followed in subsequent military conflicts;" and (2) the major relevant
consensual agreements entered into from 1948 to 1973 bearing on the protection
3 J. B. SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (1915).
4 Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, CMND. 550 (1953).
5 Stricto sensu in this context refers to war crimes which, in general, would also be
regarded as crimes in municipal law, i.e., murder. A war crime may also be a crime against
humanity if it is perpetrated on a large scale, i.e., mass murder.
6 5&6 United Kingdom, H.M.S.O., THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG (1946)
[hereinafter cited as I.M.T., NUREMBERG].
7 8 United Nations War Crimes Commission, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM-
INALS 35 (1947-49) [hereinafter cited as U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION].
8 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 526 (1968).
9 Id. at 528.
10 Id. at 530.
11 Id. at 534.
12 Id. at 539.
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of the innocent individual from detention or death at the hands of belligerents
or political terrorists.
II. Historical Background
The practice of taking or exchanging hostages is an ancient one and was
originally "a means of insuring the execution of treaties, armistices, and other
agreements"' 3 or a punishment or reprisal. 4 The feature common to all types of
hostages is that individuals who are not themselves responsible for the action or
omission at issue are made to suffer restrictions of their personal freedom. 5
The Roman historian Livy mentions the taking of hostages in the course
of the very early Roman campaigns against neighboring Italian cities. Although
the accuracy of detail in Livy's account is suspect, the general theory of the
taking of hostages on both a unilateral and a consensual basis at that early date
is evidently reliable. One of the stories, particularly interesting for its humani-
tarian sensibilities, details the refusal of a prominent Roman general to accept as
hostages young boys traitorously offered to the Romans by their tutor. When the
tutor pointed out to the general that the detention of the boys would ensure the
fall of their parents' besieged city, the general replied by freeing the boys with
the statement, "We bear not our arms against children." 6 This is one of the
earliest written evidences of a conflict between the standard of civilization and
military necessity being resolved in favor of the former.
Professor Khadduri spoke of the practice of taking hostages in antiquity in
his treatise on Islamic law. He stated that
to ensure the execution of the terms of treaties, hostages (rahd'in) were
often given or exchanged. The system of hostages was common among the
nations of antiquity and was practiced in ancient Greece and Rome. (foot-
note omitted). Ancient practice was such that, if the treaty obligations were
fulfilled, the hostages were returned unharmed to their country. If, however,
the treaty was violated, the hostages were regarded as prisoners of war and
sometimes were subjected to 'certain measures of hardship. The Muslims
regarded hostages as inviolable and were treated [sic] with consideration and
kindness. If the treaty was violated and war was declared the Muslims
sent back the hostages to their country; but if war was not declared the
hostages were either kept at hand or sent back home.'
As in the Roman example, the avowedly consensual and strictly utilitarian nature
of the hostage taking tradition seems, in its ultimate application, i.e., the killing
of the hostages for "contractual" breaches, to have been limited by humanitarian
concerns. This, too, is early evidence of an exemplary restraint in the practice, if
not the theory, of hostage treatment.
Until the middle of the eighteenth century hostage taking remained pre-
ponderantly consensual in nature. The Peace Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748
13 1. J. W. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 305 (1920).
14 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 235.
15 Id.
16 Livy, THE HISTORY OF ROME.
17 M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAw OF ISLAm 218 (1955).
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was the last time that the exchange of hostages between European powers was
consensually ritualized.18 The British and French colonial frontiers, however,
were the scenes of such continued stipulations for another century.19 This
frontier phenomenon is predicated directly on the inherent nature of mercantilism
coupled with colonial expansion. Investment required protection, as did colonists,
against the depredations of native populations which often had the untoward
inclination to refuse to take to heart the appeal of foreign based imperialism or
the religious proselyting which followed hard on its heels. The teleology of the
English and French activity was to take and hold the colonies with a minimum
of European bloodshed for the greater pecuniary glory of their respective
monarchs. Ideologically, the colonizers were well-armed with the two-pronged
spear of laissez-faire and Christianity. The subjugation of the native population
in accordance with this prevailing ideology was achieved in part by hostage
taking. Although consensual elements remained in these frontier hostage trans-
actions, the embryonic stages of politically motivated duress which developed
into hostage taking qua terrorism as it is today can be clearly detected.
As the consensual element of the transaction was dwindling in importance,
the killing of the hostages was increasingly regarded as barbaric." The failure of
this practice to prevent breaches of agreements led rapidly to its obsolescence as
an effective pressure point in international bargaining. Declarations of war,
reprisals or national action under the rubric of self-defense, all of which in-
variably led to the unilateral taking of hostages, became the order of the day in
reaction to or in avoidance of such breaches, but the killing of the hostages taken
was avoided. For example, Napoleon unilaterally took hostages during his
Italian campaigns as a politically expedient means of insuring the allegiance of
the Italians, but deportation to France seems to have been the only adverse
action taken against the hostages in cases of civil resistance." In this century,
however, the Russian revolution and the ensuing totalitarian state, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the German aggressions in World Wars I and II, the Symbionese
Liberation Army, and the Italian Brigante Rosse are concrete examples of the
proliferation of the taking and killing of hostages as a tool of political coercion
and convenience used by groups which meet concerted opposition to the goals
and ideologies they have espoused.
Solzhenitsyn, in his book The Gulag Archipelago, paints a vivid picture of
the brutal excesses committed by the Soviet regime, particularly under Lenin,
including indiscriminate arrests which amounted to hostage taking. This and
subsequent judicial murders were calculated to intimidate vocal intellectuals.
The taking of peasant hostages from communal farms ensured good harvests. All
of these excesses prevented the "wrecking" of the Soviet economy and social
structure. He emphasizes repeatedly that Lenin espoused a policy of terrorism
as the most effective form of political manipulation of the psychology of a
populace. Any who attempted to derogate their allegiance to the Party on ac-
count of this strategy were not merely persona non grata, but enemies of the state
18 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 235 n.6.
19 Id. at 235.
20 Id.
21 See GARNER, supra note 13, at 305.
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par excellence. Lenin indulged in the paradox of nominating such dissenters
both naive and criminal. The teleology of this attitude was professed to be the
dictatorship of the proletariat. In actual fact, it was simply the aggrandizement
and consolidation of power in one man. The ideological basis for this wholesale
terrorization lies in the Communist theory that revolution (and the attendant
violence) are not only to be condoned, but to be considered necessary to achieve
the "true" world order. The psychological effect on the intellectuals and on the
peasants is a study in the dichotomy of human nature. The intellectuals con-
tinued to be vocal and turned to Western society for a hearing. The peasant
population, on the other hand, neither worked harder in the fields to produce
the required good harvests nor retaliated. The effectiveness of hostage taking in
the U.S.S.R., therefore, seems to have been limited.22
The Arab-Israeli conflict provides an even more illustrative example of
political terrorism in an armed conflict not characterized as an international war.
In their struggle for supremacy, both Arab nationalists (the Palestinian
Liberation Organization) and Zionists (the Yishuv or Jewish community in
Palestine) supplement their frontal attacks with international airline hijack-
ing and internal disruption of public and private transport. The taking
and killing of hostages characterize these activities. In this conflict, well-
developed and self-righteous teleological attitudes are accompanied by ap-
propriately self-serving condemnations of terrorist actions by both sides. Two
short quotations will be illustrative. In the first, a Zionist speaks for the Jews
and their homeland: "After all it is the relentless and indiscriminate waves of ter-
rorism initiated, planned and excuted by the the PLO and other extremist
Palestinian Arab nationalists that have consistently and massively blocked any
attempt at rapprochement between the antagonists, let alone a durable peace."2
In the second, an equally righteous Arab nationalist postulates that: "the con-
tinuance of indiscriminate murder and condoned terrorism can only lead to
forfeiture by the community24 of all right in the eyes of the world to be numbered
among civilized people."2 The basic premise of both quotations-that terrorism
is barbarous-makes both statements acceptable. Much of the remaining
language is, however, self-serving and inflammatory. The word of most interest
in both statements is "indiscriminate" as a modifier of "terrorism." This attempt
to recognize and articulate degrees of violence and relativity in terroristic activity
is extremely significant as an indication of a trend on the part of the wrongdoers
themselves to formulate a doctrine of "responsible violence."26 The importance
22 The relevance of Soviet hostage taking may not be readily apparent because of the
internal police nature of the steps taken. The Soviet government, however, pursues these
measures against ostensible "counter-revolutionaries" and "wreckers" and, though both cate-
gories are transparent fabrications, any nation should be bound to apply international customary
law to its treatment of its own citizens as objects of that law when the government itself has
alleged the violent (armed conflict) nature of the activities of its detainees.
23 Y. ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 212 (1976).
24 Here the Jewish community.
25 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 6 (1946-48) 9238.
26 The concept of "responsible violence" is not a strict legal doctrine although it does
suggest an alternate approach to resolving the problem of hostage taking. In essence, "re-
sponsible violence" connotes a modification of the terrorists' philosophy based on political
expedience and not morality. In order for terrorism to be effective it must at the same time
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of "honor among thieves" must never be underestimated. It may, in the end,
be the ultimate solution; to shame a kidnapper into releasing his hostage is just
as effective as to do so by force of law.
During World War I, the Germans took hostages on an "unprecedented
scale"2 7 from the civilian inhabitants of the territories occupied by their forces in
order to prevent civilian uprising. One typical order was promulgated in 1914
following the German defeat in the battle of the Marne.
In order adequately to assure the safety of the troops and to guarantee
a calm attitude on the part of the population of Rheims, the persons named
below have been taken as hostages by the German High Command. These
hostages will be hanged if the least attempt is made to create a disturbance,
and if any infraction of what has been laid down has been committed, the
town will be wholly or partially burned and the inhabitants hanged. On
the other hand if the town keeps absolutely peaceful and calm the hostages
and inhabitants will be taken under the protection of the German Army.2 8
In both Belgium and France, numerous hostages were taken to insure that
requisitions were met, to insure that contribution demands were met, to insure
shock and elicit respect based on fear. The dedication of the terrorists to their ideals must
always be prominent and is the single aspect of their activity which will allow them to
rationalize the auto-abortion of any single episode of planned violence-for instance the release
of a hostage before demands are met or refusal to kill a hostage in spite of the failure of
specified conditions. A quotation from Arafat will illustrate the position.
The overwhelming majority of the masses believe that Fateh is wise and objective.
Wisdom means such proper conduct of affairs that the attainment of the objective is
guaranteed. And if in saying "Fateh is moderate" some people imply that it uses
violence with responsibility, this would be a source of pride to us and it would be an
honor to us to be dubbed "moderate" in that sense.
We in Fateh believe that hope is one thing and reality another. Our masses
cannot anymore tolerate an extremist demagogue who does nothing to change
the status quo. That's why Fateh's 'Command always tackles matters seriously
and refuses to embark on adventures. If you followed closely our march since the
beginning of our armed struggle, you would note that we never relinquished any of
the positions we were able to reach. Nevertheless, while holding to and safeguarding
the gains we achieved, we study our next step thoroughly. We are a revolution which
cannot afford a setback at present.
Some people who want to distinguish themselves from us by acting in such a
way as to make the people believe that they are extremists, do so while realizing that
mass reaction will be limited. We, on the other hand, are responsible for the masses.
We refuse to drive the masses into positions where they cannot secure new mass gains.
We are proud of the fact that despite the world's knowledge that force has its
basic role on the Arab-Palestinian field, we were able to convince the world that ours
is a human revolution which respects the human being, wherever he is. I think it
is about time to start speaking of responsible violence which respects the human being
and which is exerted for his sake.
RECORD OF .THE ARAB WORLD at 3882 (June, 1970).
Although such a concept may seem to many as much a contradiction in terms as the phrase
"laws of war," it is an attempt to mitigate the negative externalities of a practice as old as
history and so efficient that the U.S.M.T. took judicial notice of that very barbarous efficacy.
Alleviation of the problem may come from three possible sources: the victims, the onlooking
world, or the perpetrators. With the victims finding themselves between Scylla and Charybdis
and the rest of the world so disorganized and timid about taking a stand against so effective a
weapon, the terrorists appear to be an equally fruitful source of ameliorating activity. Even
if the only step the terrorists take is to withdraw from themselves the carte blanche method,
the rest of the world would find it much easier to understand and perhaps even sympathize
with their goals. Abandonment of wholesale slaughter of innocents, being the forswearing
of a primary weapon, might conceivably lead to a willingness to accept compromise or at least
to a more civilized method of achieving the goals of war and politics.
27 See GARNER, supra note 13, at 298.
28 Id. at 303.
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that fines levied against communities were paid, to prevent civilian espionage,
and to prevent the destruction of railways, bridges, and other strategic installa-
tions. In some instances, the hostages were marched in front of German columns
to insure that the troops would not be fired upon.29 This positioning of hostages
at column heads extended to protecting German troops from being fired upon
by both civilian and regular military forces of the enemy. Such actions brought
the Hague Regulations regarding the propriety of taking hostages for use as
military deterrents directly into issue. That "the whole German policy in respect
to the taking of hostages . . . was contrary to the most elementary notions of
humanity and justice"3 seems evident. More specifically, that policy was based
on "entire disregard of the well-established distinction between the rights of non-
combatants and those of lawful belligerents and resulted in the punishment of
innocent persons for acts for which they could in no way have been justly held
responsible."'" The stage was thus set for the trials of the German major war
criminals following World War II.
The increasing danger that hostage taking poses for modern society, and in
particular for those persons in positions of wealth, influence, or notoriety, is
evidenced by the Symbionese Liberation Army-Hearst incident and the Brigante
Rosse-Moro incident. Societal splinter groups infatuated with radical philoso-
phies are tempted by their smallness and lack of publicity to victimize individuals
whose fame will accrue to the crime and, hopefully, to the philosophy itself. In
such cases the consequent publicity and recognition attained through com-
munications with high officials and the press make actual demands and threats
and, more importantly, the fate of the hostage largely irrelevant to the perpetra-
tors. The individual thus becomes correspondingly more vulnerable. Although
these two examples are admittedly within the jurisdiction of the nations whose
misfortune it is to be the situs of the crimes, the trend illustrated may well affect
the philosophy and practice of hostage taking on an international scale.
A foundation having been laid by this brief synopsis of the history of hostage
taking, the state of international law today as it has evolved in reaction to this
sort of activity, both in consensual agreements and international judicial practice,
may profitably be examined.
III. The Reaction: Consensual Agreements and International
Judicial Practice-1899 to 1949
A. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
In August of 1898, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Count
Mouravieff, circulated a proposal for discussions to limit the development of
armaments and to ensure peace. A second written message indicated the Czar's
desire to make use of the Naval War stipulations of the Geneva Convention of
1864 and the Land Warfare stipulations of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874.
The conference, composed of delegates from twenty-six nations, met in the sum-
29 Id. at 304.




mer of 1899 at the Hague. The product of this conference was three conven-
tions for the pacific settlement of international disputes. It was assumed that
the conference would be called annually, but the fine irony of history found the
prime mover, Russia, embroiled in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. President
Roosevelt's intervention in that conflict hastened its termination and the Czar felt
free to propose the second conference at the Hague. At this conference, the
original three conventions were revised and ten more adopted. In addition, the
final act included numerous declarations, resolutions, recommendations, and
voex32 of moral but not legally binding force.
In the interpretation of these conventions and signed declarations Professor
Scott points out that
most of the conventions and signed declarations concerning war contain a
clause to the effect that they only bind belligerents who have ratified them
and then only if all the belligerents are contracting powers. It is therefore
necessary to ascertain whether all belligerents have ratified a particular con-
vention before pronouncing it to be in effect as regards them. It should,
however, be pointed out that the failure of a belligerent to ratify a particular
convention as such is not binding upon it; it does not and cannot mean
that the principles of law contained in the convention may not bind
the conduct of the parties. It is therefore necessary still further to ascertain
whether the provisions of the convention are merely a codification of inter-
national law, although the convention itself, or this part of it may be in-
effective. A careful examination of the conventions of the two conferences
will show that most of their provisions are declaratory, not amendatory, of
international law, and that the failure of one power or of any number of
powers to ratify them is merely to be regarded as a rejection of a codified
text, not as the rejection of principles of international law, which no power
can reject without excluding itself from the society of nations.3
This interpretation has been subsequently endorsed by the majority of legal
writers and the International Military Tribunals which handed down their
judgments after World War II. The Hague Conventions are therefore declara-
tory rather than constitutive treaties in spite of the general participation clauses. 4
The Hague Convention IV of 1907 (which was substituted for the Hague
Convention III of 1899) respecting the laws and customs of war on land is the
convention which is pertinent to this discussion. The preamble sets out the
object of the treaty as being, inter alia, the desire to serve "the interests of
humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization."'" Further, they specify
that the document is meant "to revise the general laws and customs of war,
either with a view to defining them with greater precision or to confining them
within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as possible."' 6 With
reference to interpretation of the treaty language, the preamble specifies that the
wording which "has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as
far as military requirements permit, [is] intended to serve as a general rule of
32 Voex is a French term signifying "wishes" or "hopes."
33 See SCOTT, supra note 3, at xi et seq.
34 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 21.




conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with
the inhabitants."3 7 Finally, with regard to interpretation of the treaty in cir-
cumstances arising in the field or otherwise during the course of war, the drafters,
realizing that the convention could not specifically deal with all conceivable
contingencies, stated that "the high contracting Parties clearly do not intend that
unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the
arbitrary judgement of military commanders."38 The de Martens Clause, a
caveat re-emphasizing, the inexhaustive nature of the Regulations, follows. It
looks forward to the formulation of an improved set of regulations and states that
[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.3 9
Articles 46 and 50, the two articles bearing directly on the issue of the taking
and killing of hostages, can be examined in the context of these defined param-
eters.
Article 46, on which the illegality of killing hostages may be precisely based,
reads in full as follows: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property as well as religious convictions and practice must be respected.
Private property can not be confiscated."" ° Not much evaluation is needed here.
If the lives of persons must be respected, killing of hostages, who by definition 1
are not personally responsible for the incidents (whether committed or antici-
pated) which constitute the grounds for their arrest, is undoubtedly forbidden.
The real issue under the Regulations is the taking of hostages. The basis
for a prohibition of such action is found in Article 50 which states that "no
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population
on account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be regarded as
jointly and severally responsible."42 Assuming in the first instance the drafters'
intent to define such a prohibition by reference to the parameters of joint and
several liability, the requisite degree of stringency with which the occupying
army must examine the ostensible responsibility of the individuals in question
must be determined. This standard would dictate when the occupier may validly
regard the populace as closely enough connected to the acts complained of to
justify their detention. Obviously an army in the field will wish to submit that
any cursory evaluation of the relationship between populace and offense is suf-
ficient to satisfy the letter of the law, or alternatively, that any act on the part of
any member of the populace of the occupied nation is an automatic indication
of the fact that the populace is solidairement responsible. These arguments do
have superficial validity if they are considered as interpretations of Article 50
37 Id. at 101.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 102.
40 Id. at 123.
41 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 241.
42 See ScoTT, supra note 3, at 124.
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made in a vacuum. Fortunately those portions of the preamble quoted above
refute any such "arbitrary judgment of military commanders." Mere self-serving
conjecture will not suffice. A solid evidentiary base is required.
A belligerent accused of a breach of this article is likely to put forward self-
defense, military necessity, reprisal, or coercion43 as justifications for taking
hostages on the basis of a tenuous connection with the alleged offense precedent
or the anticipated offense subsequent. If military necessity is urged, the pro-
visions of the preamble provide a succinct and powerful argument against its
acceptance, even without resort to the arguable contention that the contracting
Parties meant to create a rule of jus strictum44 which would preclude the necessity
defense entirely. The concept of reprisals and closely related tu quoque"5 defense
could be excluded on the basis of the interpretation that the contracting Parties
intended to create consensual jus cogens"' which of course precludes resort to re-
prisals. Again, this is merely rebuttable speculation concerning the intent of
the drafters. The justifications of self-defense and coercion can be met only by
general policy considerations, i.e., the necessity for maintaining the standard of
civilization against a reversion to barbarism, and not by the letter of the conven-
tion. Although it seems logical and desirable to construe the intent of the
drafters to support a finding that the taking of hostages is illegal, the articles
of the convention per se do not specifically and absolutely mandate this con-
clusion. The conditional inference that may be drawn from Article 50 is less
than satisfactory as a legal basis for preventative or remedial action.
B. International Judicial Practice
Essential to the understanding of the Nuremberg Major War Criminals
Trials is the nature of war crimes jurisdiction." Such jurisdiction is premised on
the concept of reprisals and is optional, i.e., there is no international criminal
code which mandates punishment of crimes perpetrated on an international
scale or with international impact. Punishment of any kind may be meted out
by the juridical body involved with the proviso that it must not be cruel and
inhuman; and, unless pursuant to deballatio or agreement otherwise, peace
terminates the jurisdiction."
The enabling act of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
43 Id.
44 Jus Strictum is law which is to be applied rigorously and literally.
45 Tu quoque is the basis for the concept of reciprocity in international law. It allows one
belligerent to act as the other belligerent has done.
46 Jus cogens refers to certain postulated, overriding principles of international law such
as prohibitions against slave trade, the waging of aggressive war, etc.
47 Se.e Scor-r, supra note 3, at 454.
48 Id. at 455. With regard to the interpretation of war crimes which equates them to
crimes in the municipal (national) sense a caveat is in order.
Compensation under Article 3 of Hague 'Convention IV of 1907 and the punishment
of war crimes are occasionally likened to civil and criminal sanctions of the laws of
war. On the level of international law as applied in unorganised or loosely organised
international society, this terminology is misleading. It suggests the existence of an
international public order which is never more remote than in a state of war. More-
over, this distinction encourages illusions: it suggests the existence of a machinery
of justice and specialised remedies, certainly not to be found in unorganised society.
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(I.M.T.) was the London Charter drafted by the Allies in 1945."' It catalogued
war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and multiple crimes
which were the result of membership in any of the organizations denominated
criminal. Article 6(b) specifically lists the killing of hostages as a war crime,5"
but leaves the issue of hostage taking open. In explanation of this position, the
chairman of the London Conference stated, "We declare what the international
law is so that there won't be any discussion on whether it is international law or
not."5
In spite of the failure of the London Charter to evidence any disapprobation
of hostage taking, Messrs. De Menthon and Dubost, deputy chief prosecutors
for the French Republic, on 17 January 1946 and again on 24 January 1946,
alleged that the taking of hostages was a crime under Hague Regulation 46.52
M. de Menthon stated that the German crimes against the person were "all...
linked to a policy of terrorism. Such a policy permits the subjugation of occupied
countries without involving a large deployment of troops and their submission
to anything that might be demanded of them." 3 The prosecution goes on to
condemn the German endeavor to "legalise such criminal practices. Thus seek-
ing to have them recognised by the populations as the right of the occupying
power. Veritable 'codes for hostages' were promulgated by the German military
authorities." 4 The most notorious of the orders was that issued by defendant
Keitel on 30 September 1941 calling for a fixed ratio or quota of 100 hostages to
be killed for each German soldier murdered and 50 hostages for each German
wounded as a reprisal of appropriate proportions for each type of incident;
Further, he ordered that all Frenchmen already in detention for whatever reason
were henceforth to be considered hostages.55 Subsequently 310 hostages were
executed in Chateaubriant, Nantes, Monvalerian, Romainville, Bordeaux, and
Paris as a reprisal for the murder of three German officers.5
M. de Menthon, in discussing the history and legal significance of war
crimes, follows the evolution and articulation of the concepts from Grotius
through the Hague Conventions to the list of war crimes compiled by the Com-
mission of Fifteen.57 Some of the first ten items on the list are of direct
relevance.
(1) Murders, massacres, systematic terrorism
(2) Killing of hostages
(3) Torture of civilians
(4) Confinement of civilians in inhuman conditions
(5) Forced labor of civilians in connection with military operations of the
enemy5 s
49 I.M.T., NUREMBERG, supra note 6, at 1.
50 Id. at 5.
51 JACKSON REPORT, MINUTES OF CONFERENCE SESSION OF JUNE 29, 1945 at 99.
52 5 & 6 I.M.T., NUREMBERG, suprz note 6, at 399-427, 119-149.
53 5 I.M.T., NUREMBERG, supra note 6, at 399.
54 Id.
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 400.
57 This list was the basis for Articles 227 et sequitur of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
58 5 I.M.T., NUREMBERG, supra note 6, at 414, 415.
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Because this list fails as well to address the legality of the taking of hostages, the
deputy prosecutor closed with an eloquent and morally but not legally compelling
statement: "The true plaintiff in this court is civilisation." 9
M. Dubost, in his presentation,"0 read to the court Article 50 of the Hague
Convention stating that it prohibits the taking of hostages. He then discussed,
in detail, the German "pseudo-law" on hostages including the killings of hostages
in the cities previously listed (in particular the killings in Chateaubriant and
Bordeaux).61 The general tenor of the German attitude toward hostages is
evident in one of their ordinances.
If acts of violence are committed by inhabitants of the country against
members of the occupation forces, if offices and installations of the Armed
Forces are damaged or destroyed, or if any other attacks are directed against
the security of German units and service establishments, and if, under
the circumstances, the population of the place of the crime or of the im-
mediate neighborhood can be considered as jointly responsible for these acts
of sabotage, measures of prevention and expiation may be ordered by which
the civil population is to be deterred in future from committing, encourag-
ing, or tolerating acts of that kind. The population is to be treated as jointly
responsible for individual acts of sabotage, if by its attitude in general
towards the German Armed Forces, it has favored hostile or unfriendly
acts of individuals, or if by its passive resistance against the investigation
of previous acts of sabotage, it has encouraged hostile elements to similar
acts, or otherwise created a favorable atmosphere for opposition to the
German occupation. All measures must be taken in a way that it is possible
to carry out. Threats that cannot be realized give the impression of weak-
ness.
62
The consequences of this general policy are amply illustrated by a second docu-
ment introduced into evidence giving a statistical and regional breakdown of
French civilian executions. "Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658;
Angers, 863; Orleans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82; Strasbourg,
211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand, 441; Lyons, 3,647;
Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785; Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy,
571; Metz, 220; Paris, 11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660.'"" Ironically, this
massive documented evidence of hostage killing allowed the Tribunal to bypass
a ruling on the legality of the mere taking of hostages. 4
It would seem at this juncture, given the Hague Regulations as a codifica-
tion of international customary law, the report of the Commission of Fifteen, the
London Charter, and the Judgement of the I.M.T. at Nuremberg, that the
killing of hostages is criminal in the international sense of the word. The
phenomenology of juridical pronouncements being what it is, however, one turns
with disappointment but not surprise to the judgment of the United States
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in The Hostages Trial which held that "the
killing of hostages was not in itself and in the abstract contrary to the inter-
59 Id. at 425.
60 6 I.M.T., NUREMBERG, supra note 6, at 120.
61 Id. at 137.
62 Id. at 122.
63 Id. at 135.
64 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, CMNur. 6964 (1946).
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national law of war." 5 In indulging in this view, the Tribunal flagrantly ignored
the provision of its own enabling act (Control Law No. 10) which specifically
outlaws the killing of hostages.
The co-defendants at the trial were charged as follows:
that defendants were principals or accessories to the murder of hundreds
of thousands of persons from the civilian population of Greece, Yugoilavia,
and Albania by troops of the German Armed Forces; that attacks by law-
fully constituted enemy military forces and attacks by unknown persons,
against German troops and installations, were followed by executions of
large numbers of the civilian population by hanging or shooting without
benefit of investigation or trial; that thousands of non-combatants, arbi-
trarily designated as "partisans," "Communists," "Communist suspects,"
"bandit suspects," were terrorized, tortured and murdered in retaliation for
such attacks by lawfully constituted enemy military forces and attacks by
unknown persons; and that defendants issued, distributed, and executed
orders for the execution of 100 "hostages" in retaliation for each German
soldier killed and fifty "hostages" in retaliation for each German soldier
wounded.66
The indictment stated further that
the acts charged in each of the four counts are alleged to have been com-
mitted wilfully, knowingly, and unlawfully and constitute violations of inter-
national conventions, The Hague Regulations, 1907, and the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived
from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal
laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and were
declared, recognised and defined as crimes by Article II of Control Council
No. 10 adopted by the representatives of the United States of America,
Great Britain, the Republic of France and the Soviet Union.
7
In its Judgment, however, the Tribunal delimited the field of inquiry to a "dis-
cussion of the right to take hostages from the innocent civilian population of
occupied territory as a guarantee against attacks by unlawful resistance forces,
acts of sabotage and the unlawful acts of unknown persons and the further right
to execute them if the unilateral guarantee is violated." '68 Upon this narrow
issue the Tribunal opined that "hostages may be taken in order to guarantee the
peaceful conduct of the populations of occupied territories and, when certain
conditions exist and the necessary preliminaries have been taken, they may, as a
last resort, be shot. The taking of hostages is based fundamentally on a theory of
collective responsibility."69
The court then listed measures that must be taken before such taking and
killing is justified, eliminating out of hand mere military expediency. To main-
tain order, the occupying army should initially pursue such steps as registration
of the inhabitants, issuance of identification cards, establishment of restricted
areas, adoption of curfews, prohibition of assembly and communication, or de-
65 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 7, at vii.
66 Id. at 35.
67 Id. at 36.
68 Id. at 60.
69 Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
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struction of property in proximity to the crime." The eminent judges generously
required "some connection between the victimized populace and the crime."',
Quota reprisals, characterized by inversely proportional ratios of numbers and
severity, were proscribed. These modest circumscriptions of the basic holding do
little to protect the innocent hostage who, notwithstanding the strict application
of the above preliminaries, finds himself on the wrong end of a rope or a gun.
The ultimate hypocritical, albeit eloquent, juridical nod to the efficacy of
barbarism, cruelty, and inhumanity in furthering the political terrorism of war
is the following statement made by the Tribunal in the course of its Judgment.
It cannot be denied that the shooting of hostages or reprisal prisoners
may under certain circumstances be justified as a last resort in procuring
peace and tranquility in occupied territory and has the effect of strengthen-
ing the position of a law abiding occupant. The fact that the practice has
been tortured beyond recognition by illegal and inhuman application cannot
justify its prohibition by judicial fiat.
72
The only consolation to be gained from an opinion evidencing such reactionary
views is that no finding of "not guilty" made in The Hostages Trial can be at-
tributed to the Tribunal's sentiments on the taking and killing of hostages. 3
Fortunately, the U.S.M.T. at Nuremberg and its Judgment do not have the
international significance of those of the I.M.T. The U.S.M.T., however, did
represent a nation having a legal system characterized by advanced and sophis-
ticated structure, and thus its decisions may have more impact on international
law than the opinion warrants.
C. The Geneva Red Cross Convention IV of 1949
The Geneva Convention of 1949 took the next obvious step with regard to
the international law concerning hostages: it unequivocally (in Article 34)74
prohibited the taking of hostages. It thus purported to answer the question which
the I.M.T. did not wish to reach, and hopefully it counteracted much of the
damage done in The Hostages Trial Judgment.
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions contains a proviso that broadens
the scope of the prohibition by extending minimum standards of humane treat-
ment to internal as well as to international armed conflict involving one of the
Contracting Parties. Article 3 of Convention IV relative to the protection of
civilian persoas in time of war reads as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
70 Id. at 62.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
73 Id. at 79.
74 CMND. 550, supra note 4, at 234.
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hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a reg-
ularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guar-
antees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised
peoples.75
This article was a major step forward in the humanitarian law of armed con-
flict.
IV. The State of the Law Today
A. Applicability of Nuremberg Principles"
Within three months of the rendering of the Nuremberg Judgment, the
United Nations General Assembly passed two resolutions one of which approved
the London Charter and the Judgment, with respect to the enunciated principles
of international law, and directed the International Law Commission (I.L.C.)
to model those principles into an international criminal code." The second
resolution specified genocide to be a crime under international law and initiated
the processes necessary to the preparation of a draft convention on the subject.7"
These two resolutions were the initial approbative measures taken in response to
the Nuremberg experience by a body representing an international quasi-order. 9
The formulation of the Nuremberg Principles by the I.L.C. appears to be
more valuable as a cogent restatement of law by an important body of drafters
with international pretensions than a truly useful criminal war code. The I.L.C.
also attempted a draft code on offenses against the peace and security of man-
kind, but because there are no international organs to punish the crimes codified,
the code must be considered as merely "a set of internationally postulated rules of
municipal law."'"
75 Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
76 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 526.
77 U.N.Y.B. 1946-47 at 254.
78 U.N.Y.B. 1946-47 at 255 & 256.
79 The Genocide Convention of 1948 is of interest to this discussion primarily because of its
general reassertion of the standard of civilization without the operation of which hostage taking
in its most barbaric forms takes place. Very often the intent to destroy a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious sector of the population is exhibited by occupying armies in their patterns
of hostage killing. One must keep in mind that due to the political, i.e. state-oriented nature of
genocidic ideology, this document is more valuable as a statement of lex ferenda than as an
effective policing medium.
80 Nuremberg Principles (1949) Y.B. INI L L. COMM'N 129.
81 See SCHWARZENBERGER,,supriz note 5, at 532.
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Considering the magnitude, virulence, and scope of the second World War
and the relatively rapid, moderately severe, and legalistic reprisals at Nuremberg,
one would expect that military law would formally reflect the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples. This has not been the case in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom or
the United States.82 The Soviet Military Code of 1952 gives only the most
skeletal consideration to war crimes. In the United States, as well, no formal
change has been made, although the Army and Navy manuals do reflect the
Charter and the Principles. The Army has, commendably, recognized all three
types of war crime, but the Navy discussion is limited to war crimes stricto sensu.
The United Kingdom Manual of Military Law also considers only war crimes
stricto sensu. Because hostage taking and killing may fall under the war crimes or
the crimes against humanity category (depending on the scale of the offense),
there is some hope that military theory may be modified at least with regard to the
killing of hostages on the basis of the informal references in these manuals.
The applicability of the Nuremberg Principles has also been limited
because armed conflict since World War II has consistently refused to call itself
war, much less international war. In a typical bloody and nameless penumbra
like Viet Nam, though atrocities were frequent occurrences and the innocent suf-
fered as much as innocents have ever suffered in a recognized war, the only way
the Nuremberg Principles could be brought into play, barring drastic change in
military theory, was by way of blatant reprisals without benefit of international
juridical authority." Any adverse judgments against prisoners of war were
bound to be viewed, and certainly publicized, as juridical murder by the "other
side" and reacted to accordingly. It seems, then, that in modem times a nation's
refusal to declare or acknowledge a state of war, even though actively waging
war, may preclude the application of the Nuremberg Principles during the con-
flict for practical reasons. After the close of the hostilities, the application may
be precluded by the lack of the proper theoretical basis for establishing interna-
tional jurisdiction. The only limitation on this intermediate sort of conflict lies
in the minimum standard of civilization requirements of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.
B. Relevant Consensual Agreements 1948 to 1973
With the increasing awareness that political terrorism is an adjunct not only
to armed conflict but to radical activism on both intra- and international levels
has come an increasing number of consensual attempts to cope with the problem.
Three illustrative groupings of these treaties are: (1) the general humanitarian
documents, (2) the documents formulated under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.), and, (3) the documents aimed
at the protection of diplomats and other protected persons.
The two most important general human rights documents are the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights84 and the European Convention on
82 These are three of the four nations who drafted the London Charter.
83 The Tokyo and Nuremberg I.M.T.'s were constituted pursuant to unconditional sur-
render in the first case and deballatio in the second, i.e. after the close of the war.
84 I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 106 (1971).
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Human Rights and its Five Protocols of 1950.5 Both are concerned with the
individual's right to life, limb, freedom of movement, belief, education, and
freedom from Arbitrary oppression. The Convention is self-regulatory with ap-
plications. (complaints) being handled and authoritatively decided by the
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. This has proved an effective peacetime enforcement system; however,
the possibility of derogating from the Convention under Article 15"6 limits ap-
plication of the general principles in wartime or other emergencies threatening
the existence of the nation in question.
The three pertinent I.C.A.O. Conventions are: (1) the 1963 Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,8 7 (2) the
1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,"' and (3)
the 1971 Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation." Article 1 of each convention defines those acts which constitute
offenses. The Tokyo Convention prohibits acts "jeopardizing the safety of per-
sons." The Hague Convention defines a wrongdoer under the article as one who
"unlawfully by intimidation exercises control of" an aircraft, while the Montreal
Convention defines a wrongdoer as one who "performs an act of violence against
a person on board" an aircraft. Hostage taking is the underlying, though un-
specified theme.
The conventions dealing with diplomats and other protected persons are
more specific in listing offenses. Both the 1971 Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance" and the 1971 Rome
Draft Convention9 specify murder and kidnapping as breaches of the conven-
tions. The 1972 Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons 2 states
in Article 2 that "[t]he intentional commission, regardless of motive, of a violent
attack upon the person or liberty of" included persons is forbidden as it in the
1973 U.N. Resolution 3166 (XXVIII) and Annex: Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents.
The primary short-term flaw in these conventions is their narrow scope as
far as protected persons as a class are concerned. What is needed are "measures
to prevent international terrorism which endangers or take[s] innocent human
lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedom, and study of the underlying causes of
85 Id. at 338.
86 Id. at 344. For an explanation of Article 15 see, Note, The Doctrine of Margin of
Appreciation and the European Convention on Human Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 90, 91
(1977).
87 I.C.A.O. Doc. 8364; 3 U.S.T. 2941 (1969); T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (the Tokyo Conven-
tion).
88 I.C.A.O. Doc. 8920; 21 U.S.T. 1641 (1971); T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (the Hague Con-
vention).
89 I.C.A.O. Doc. 8966; T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (1972) (the Montreal Convention).
90 O.A.S. Document AC/Doc 88. rev. 1 corr. 1 of Feb. 2, 1971; U.N. Doc A/C 6/418
November 2, 1972, Annex V.
91 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 114, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1974).
92 INT'L L. COMM'N, Report, 24 U.N. GAOR 88, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972).
93 G.A. Res. 3166 (1974).
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those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration,
grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives,
including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes."9 It seems, how-
ever, that the piecemeal approach to the problem of terrorism and hostage taking
is more acceptable to those nations whose ratifications are importan9 5 than is a
general and potentially restrictive convention drafted in broad language with the
possibility of even broader interpretation. Augmenting the class of protected
persons by the treatment of easily recognized, highly defined groups in separate
conventions seems to be a workable long-range approach to the utilization of con-
sensual agreements to control hostage taking. Self-policing systems and strict
limitations on, if not elimination of, the possibility of derogation, would be of
undeniable usefulness as well. In essence, restricted ratione personae and ratione
materiae are quite often the key to a successful treaty.
V. Conclusion
With the exception of the anomalous decision in the Hostages Trial, all
international authority discussed above, i.e. the Hague Conventions, the Nurem-
berg Principles, the Geneva Red Cross Conventions, outlaw the killing of
hostages. The uncertainty lies with the legality of taking hostages.
As far as prevention of coercion (the taking and killing of hostages) is
concerned, the consensual agreements discussed above and military law must be
scrutinized. The lack of an effective policing structure, the possibility of deroga-
tion, and the sharply circumscribed scope of recent coventions all combine to
seriously weaken the immediate efficacy of consensual agreements. The blurred
or nonexistent reflection of the Nuremberg Principles in modern military manuals
evidences the status quo orientation of military methodology, in which ends too
often justify the means. Prevention of coercion is, then, predicated on the good
faith of the contracting parties and some modification of armed forces teleological
orientation-weak foundations at best.
Reprisals seem even today the most powerful weapons in the international
legal arsenal. War crimes jurisdiction, however, which is grounded on this
concept is terminated by peace in the absence of deballatio or agreement other-
wise. This means that unacknowledged wars, status mixtus, and internal armed
conflict will, for lack of the theoretical basis of jurisdiction, remain unpoliced,
because prevention is unlikely and warlike reprisals will merely accelerate and
escalate the violence.
The seemingly inescapable treadmill of coercion and reprisal brings to mind
the myth of Sisyphus. The ability of the nations of the world to push the stone to
the top of the mountain and leave it may very well lie with the hostage takers
themselves.
Mary Kay Mattson
94 U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/418 at 5 (1972).
95 Those nations that make use of terroristic tactics are extremely reluctant to ratify treaties
or conventions which would limit or preclude the use of such effective combat techniques.
These nations have typically unstable governments and are often classified as third world
nations.
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